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STUDY OF CIRCUMVENTION:
THE ENFORCIBILITY OF "BROWN"
By HUGH WM. FLEISCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
An historic and vital opinion was rendered by the United States
Supreme Court on May 17, 1954. Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, Kansas' has had and undoubtedly will continue to have a
monumental effect upon the lives of millions of Americans. This de-
cision announced that an established practice and, indeed, attitude
of a large segment of this country are contrary to the Constitution
of the United States. The Supreme Court, in deciding state-enforced
public school segregation to be unconstitutional, took cognizance
of the fact that there were to be manifold problems of enforcibility
of this decision. In the second Brown decision,2 the Court stated
that: "Full implementation of these constitutional principles may
require solution of varied local school problems, '3 and decided that
the school authorities would have primary responsibility for solving
the problems with power vested in the federal district courts to
determine whether the actions of the school authorities constitute
good faith implementation of the constitutional duty to end racial
discrimination in the public schools.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analysis of the
problems involved in the enforcement of the Brown decision inso-
far as these problems are created by recognized officials of the
state governments. The majority of these problems are not adminis-
trative but arise out of the belief on the part of elected officials
and others who work under the auspices of the southern state gov-
ernments that the Brown decision is legally and morally wrong.
This is illustrated in a statement signed by seventeen United States
Senators and seventy-seven United States Representatives: "We
commend the motives of those States which have declared the in-
tention to resist forced integration by any lawful means."14
The obstacles to school desegregation established by southern
officialdom cover a wide spectrum ranging from resistance by legis-
lative enactment to the subtle harassments of administrative pro-
ceedings. In addition to illustrating the various means used to re-
sist the Brown decision, the action taken by the respective federal
district courts and the federal courts of appeals in response to these
resistance measures will be analyzed. The scope of the discussion
will not include the manifold societal and economic instruments
which have been used to stifle the effectiveness of the Brown
decision.
5
The statistics of recent years clearly indicate that the resistance
* June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.
'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).3 Id. at 299.
4 ERWIN, Declaration of Constitutional Principles, DESEGREGATION AND THE
SUPREME COURT 103 (Ziegler ed. 1958).
5 See generally GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW (1959).
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measures have enjoyed no little success. As of 1958 there were
seven states which did not have a single desegregated school dis-
trict and three more states which had an almost negligible degree
of desegregation.6 In 1964 the numbers of Negroes in school with
whites in southern states and the percentages of total Negro en-
rollments are as follows:
Percentage of Negroes
in Integrated Schools
Number of Negroes in Relation to







North Carolina 1,865 .538
South Carolina 10 .004
Tennessee 4,446 2.71
Texas 14,000 (approx.) 4.29
Virginia 3,721 1.57
In these eleven states the policies of official resistance have
played a prominent role; therefore the bulk of this paper will be
concerned with the activities in these southern states."
II. DEFIANCE MEASURES
The first and most prominent resistance measure undertaken
by some southern state governments was that of the interposition
statute. This statute says, in essence, that the state may interpose
its sovereignty against that of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The prominence of this measure quickly vanished, however,
when confronted with a federal court action. In one of the few cases
which made more than mention of the interposition statute, the
court rather decisively said, ". . . interposition is not a constitutional
doctrine. If taken seriously, it is illegal defiance of constitutional
authority." 9 Most of the federal courts which have considered state
statutes incorporating the interposition doctrine have felt that the
doctrine did not have sufficient legal validity to warrant discussion.
One federal district judge branded the interposition resolution "an
escape valve through which the legislators blew off steam to re-
lieve their tensions.' 10 The Supreme Court, in considering the is-
sues that had arisen in Little Rock, Arkansas, made a restatement
of basic principles in answer to the interposition statute and sim-
ilar measures." The Court stated that the Constitution is the
"Supreme Law of the Land" and that the Supreme Court has the
established right to interpret the Constitution so as to make the
6 qouthern School News, Feb. 1958.
7 New York Times Western Edition, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 15, col. 5.
8 Southern School News, Sept. 1954.
9 Bush v. Orleans Parish School B'd, 188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D. La. 1960).
10 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham B'd of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372, 381 (N.D.
Ala. 1958).
11 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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Brown decision the "Supreme Law... any thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'
1 2
Another group of laws enacted by most of the southern states
were the measures requiring the immediate closing of schools upon
the desegregation of those schools.13 The most notorious plan for
school closing was that of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 14 a plan
declared unconstitutional by a federal district court in James v. Al-
mond'5 and in violation of the Virginia Constitution by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals.' 6 In the case of James v. Almond, the
district court reasoned:
Virginia, having accepted and assumed the responsibility
of maintaining and operating public schools, cannot act
through one of its officers to close one or more public
schools . . . [because of enrollment of Negroes] . . . and,
at the same time, keep other public schools throughout the
state open on a segregated basis. 17
Hence the court predicated its holding on the fact that the
state exercised control over the schools. When the district court
rendered this decision there was no question as to the exercise of
control over the schools, in that Virginia had assumed the operation
of all of the schools in the state through the so-called "massive
resistance" legislation,' which included an elaborate scheme to
establish "private" segregated schools. Benjamin Muse, a Virginian
and former Republican gubernatorial candidate, remarked, "A
sacrifice of public education, extremists believed would show to
the world the depth of Virginia's resentment of the Supreme Court's
'intrusion'.' 9 The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Harrison v.
Day,20 decided the school closing to be invalid, basing its decision
upon the violation of the state constitutional requirements to "main-
tain an efficient system of public free schools throughout the
12 U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2.
13 See generally PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 193-197 (1961).
14 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-188.3 to 188.15 (Supp. 1958).
15 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959).
16 Harrison v. Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959).
17 170 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. Va. 1959).
IS MUSE, VIRGINIA'S MASSIVE RESISTANCE, p. 53 (1961).
19 Ibid.
20 Supra note 16.
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State. '21 In one of the last reported of a succession of cases dealing
with the Prince Edward County school closing situation,22 which
has seen the schools of that county closed for more than four
years, the federal district court in Allen v. County School B'd
2 3
refused to accept the county school board's argument that the board
was an autonomous unit. This argument, had it been accepted,
would have skillfully avoided the doctrine of James v. Atmond,
which requires that there be state control to allow the federal
court to invalidate a limited school closing. The court looked to
those sections of the Virginia Constitution which relate to the state
support of schools and arrived at the conclusion that the local
board operated the schools in conjunction with the state instru-
mentalities and operated under standards and practices maintained
by the state so that the closing of the Prince Edward County schools
was in contravention of the principles stated in James v. Almond.
It would appear as a result of the Allen v. County School B'd deci-
sion that almost any degree of control exercised over the schools
by the state will bring the reasoning of James v. Almond into
effect. The district court arrived at the conclusion that state con-
trol existed on the basis of such factors as: partial appropriation
from the general assembly, state constitutional provisions for the
appointment and duties of a superintendent of public instruction
and of a state board of education and, also, the fact that school text
books, minimum teachers' salaries and many other school proce-
dures are governed by state law.
24
The teaching of these cases is that a state wishing to close a
school system which has been forced to desegregate must either
close all of the schools in the state, a situation which seems hardly
plausible in the twentieth century,25 or completely divorce itself
from the operation of those closed school districts in virtually
every respect. Such an estrangement, as a practical matter, might
be impossible to achieve considering first the desire on the part
of the states to exercise control over the operation of its schools
and, secondly, the economic facts of life which would beseige the
vast majority of southern school districts if faced with the problem
21 VA. CONST. art. IX § 129.
22 The federal court of appeals decided that the federal district court should
have abstained to await state court determination of the validity of the
public school closing in Prince Edward County. Griffin v. Board of Super-
visors of Prince Edward County, 322 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1963). The Su-
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia had held that the Virginia Constitu-
tion did not compel the state to reopen public schools in Prince Edward
County. County School B'd of Prince Edward County v. Griffin, 204 Va.
650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963). The Supreme Court of United States invoked
its power to hear the case on its merits without waiting for final action
by the court of appeals. Griffin v. County School B'd of Prince Edward
County, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3216 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1963) (No.. 592). The Su-
preme Court decided that the Prince Edward County school closing was
violative of the "Equal Protection Clause" of the fourteenth amendment
and allowed the district court to order a reopening of the schools if
necessary. Griffin v. County School B'd of Prince Edward County, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 4413 (U.S. May 26, 1964).
23 Allen v. County School B'd of Prince Edward County, 207 F. Supp. 349
(E.D. Va. 1962).
24 Id. at 352.
25 See 1961 COM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP. ch. 12.
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of financing operations without state support. At the same time,
when one considers the almost inconceivable extremes to which
some state legislatures have gone in attempts to avoid the deseg-
regation of their schools it becomes less difficult to imagine a state
sanctioning a complete school shutdown.
One of the most notable examples of drastic measures was that
passed by the Louisiana Legislature and ruled unconstitutional
by the federal district court.2 16 In part, the measure provided that
any school under an order to desegregate was to be immediately
closed, whereupon the school board ceased to exist; to effectuate
these directives, by force if necessary, the state police were given
additional powers and placed under the orders of the legislature
and it was further provided by statute that, if demonstrators were
needed, they could be recruited among the students who were no
longer compelled to go to school. 27 One might also consider the
strength, in some of the southern states, of such organizations as
the White Citizens Council before drawing a conclusion as to the
possibility of a state-wide school closing. It has been observed that
the White Citizens Council exercises almost complete control over
at least one southern state, that of Mississippi. 28
There are innumerable examples of other "blatant" means
used to avoid rules set forth by the segregation cases. Prominent
among these means is gerrymandering of school districts. The town
of Hillsboro, Ohio, had zoned two separate districts, on opposite
ends of the community for its one Negro school, which zoning was
decided to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment.29 Another
plan struck down was the application of a brother-sister rule (re-
quiring that any child in grades one through six must attend the
same school as his older brother or sister) to a school district which
had established a stair-step plan of desegregation beginning with
the desegragation of the first grade one year and the addition of
one succeeding grade in each subsequent year. The court of ap-
peals pointed out the obvious discrepancy between this brother-
sister rule and a meaningful program of desegration in that a sub-
stantial number of Negro first grade children would be forced to
go to segregated schools.
3 0
Also, several important and highly publicized cases have dealt
with admission to institutions of higher learning. Characteristic
of the various plans utilized are their embarrassingly unsophisticated
methods. A Louisiana statute which required a high school principal
to attest to the good moral character of the prospective college
student was applied so that Negro high schools were furnished
certificates addressed only to Negro colleges. This application of
26 Bush v. Orleans Parish School B'd, supra note 9.
27 Id. at 928.
28 Carter, Citadel of the Citizens Council, N. Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1961 (Maga-
zine), p. 23.
29 Clemons v. Board of Educ. of Hillsboro, Ohio, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.
1956). More subtle means of gerrymandering or some semblance thereof
are found in Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 294 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1961) and Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962) in
which the court found that an all-Negro school having a separate admin-
istration and being surrounded by white districts was the basis for a
discrimination finding.
30 Ross v. Dyer, 312 F.2d 191 (5th Cr. 1963).
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the statute was found to be unacceptable 1 A requirement, rem-
iniscent of the "grandfather clause," that an applicant to a uni-
versity or college forward a recommendation by one or more alu-
mni of the institution met its demise in one district court with
these words, "The effect . . . has been, is, and will be, to prevent
Negroes from meeting this admission requirement. 3 2 Another
case agreed-some three years later, in the course of extended
litigation3 which was to bring James Meredith to the University
of Mississippi as the first known member of his race to enter a
"white" school in that state. The court held that the alumni cer-
tificate requirement, ". . is a heavy burden on qualified Negro
students, because of their race. '34 The court also took judicial no-
tice of the fact that the requirement was enacted a few months
after the Brown decision had been rendered. The Meredith litiga-
tion seems clearly to indicate the degree of difficulty which lies
ahead for Negroes in their full realization of non-segregated school
systems. One must not overlook the fact that the obstacles presented
to the plaintiff, Meredith, were devised and implemented by the
highest officials of education in the State of Mississippi. 35 In one
instance the court of appeals remarked, in response to allegations
and tactics used by the state officials, that "his case was tried below
and argued here in the eerie atmosphere of never-never land. '36
There was also comment made as to the lack of fairness which
Meredith received in the federal district court. The court of appeals
looked to the fact that ". . . the counsel for the defendants was
allowed so much latitude while at the same time counsel for the
plaintiff was so severely circumscribed in the examination of wit-
nesses, introduction of evidence and argument . . .-37
31 Board of Supervisors v. Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958).
-"-Hunt v. Arnold, 172 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1959).
33 Delays caused the Meredith case to carry through the February term,
two summer terms and the regular terms of 1961-1962. Meredith v. Fair,
305 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1962).
34 Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962).
35 The reasons promoted by the University in its rejection of the application
submitted by Meredith were as follows: a) Overcrowding of dormitories.
The court found that there were 400-500 less than the number of males
the previous semester.
b) Non-recognition of the school which Meredith was then attending. It
was found that this school was supervised by the same trustees as those
at the University of Mississippi. It is also interesting to note the ironic
change of official attitude toward Negro schools from the day when the
general pronouncements were as to the separate equality of Negro edu-
cation.
c) Alleged false voting registration. This allegation was termed by the
Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, ". . . a frivolous defense."
d) Meredith accused of being a troublemaker. The data upon which this
accusation was based were excerpts from admittedly incomplete Air Force
records, and the court stated that "One short answer to the defendants'
contention is the Good Conduct Medal."
e) Bad characer risk charge. It was decided that this assertion represented"scraping the bottom of the barrel."
The court concluded in these words: "Reading the 1350 pages in the record
as a whole, we find that James Meredith's application for transfer to the
University of Mississippi was turned down solely because he was a Negro."
Meredith v. Fair, supra note 34.




III. SCHOOL BOARD TACTICS
One strategy that has gained wide acceptance among school
boards and sometimes used while maintaining the outward appear-
ance of "good faith" action is delay. School boards may take the
position, as has been taken by Governor George Wallace of Ala-
bama,3 8 that the Brown case binds only the specific parties before
the Court and that non-action on the part of other school boards
which have not been specifically enjoined is perfectly constitu-
tional.
The matter of delay in the implementation of school desegration
has reached the Supreme Court.3 9 The Little Rock School Board
requested a delay on the basis of widespread public hostility which
caused tension and unrest. The Court refused to grant such a post-
ponement, while recognizing the good faith of the board and the
fact that educational progress would continue to suffer under the
then existing circumstances. The Court decided that unrest en-
gendered by official actions of the governor and the Arkansas
Legislature could not be valid basis for a delay in desegregation.
40
The Supreme Court discussed the matter of delay in more
general terms in the second Brown decision, 41 saying that dis-
agreement with the constitutional principles would not be an
accepted basis for delay. The Court also set down those problems
which might be validly considered by the courts in their deter-
mination of whether additional time was warranted. These prob-
lems included administration, physical limitations of the school,
transportation, personnel, revision of districts, and revision of local
laws. However, the Court limited the consideration of these prob-
lems to a time only after the school board had made a prompt and
reasonable start toward full compliance. 42 There have been situa-
tions in which the courts have allowed delays based upon admin-
istrative difficulties,4 3 overcrowding,44 or school closing elections,
45
but in most cases the boards were making an "actual" effort toward
compliance, at least to the degree of having established a tentative
plan of initial school desegregation.
Some school boards have refused to act toward some compliance
even after a decree has been issued by the district court. In one
case, in which the school board had completely failed to act, the
district judge granted the school authorities a seven year extension
to allow preparation of a desegregation plan. This extension was
reversed by the court of appeals. 46 The court made a specific decree
that the school board receive and consider applications so that non-
racial admittance could be made by a certain date.47 This decree
38 Speech by Governor Wallace, University of Denver, Jan. 8, 1964.
39 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
40 Ibid.
41 Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
42 Ibid.
43 Bush v. Orleans Parish School B'd, 308 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1962).
44 Wilburn v. Holland, 155 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
45 Calhoun v. Members of B'd of Educ., City of Atlanta, 188 F. Supp. 401
(N.D. Ga. 1959).
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was thwarted by the closing of the public schools. The Ft. Worth,
Texas, School Board had a stated policy of segregation and for that
reason refused to act. The court of appeals stated that an order
should be issued categorically abolishing the segregation policy and
requiring the board to present a reasonable plan.
48
In other situations, a board might put forth an ostensible plan
which the court feels to be ". . . a speculative possibility wrapped
in disuasive qualifications, '49 or might offer some other type of
plan which retains racial factors as principal criteria in the effectua-
tion of that plan. In one such case the court did not invalidate the
plan saying, ". . . we are confident that steps will be taken promptly
to end the present discriminatory practice . . ."50 However, more
than a year and six months later the same court was forced to say,
... our hopes have been disappointed," and the district court man-
date that Negroes be admitted was upheld.-1
The status of the decisions concerning delay appears to be that
the courts will enter a specific decree requiring desegregation once
it is apparent that a school board has no intention of implementing
a meaningful plan. However, as has already been illustrated, it is
more than difficult to make a general observation concerning
analagous decisions in the field of school segregation. A striking
48 Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
49 Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960).
50 Dodson v. School B'd of City of Charlottesville, Va., 289 F.2d 439 (4th
Cir. 1961).
51 Dillard v. School B'd of City of Charlottesville, Va., 308 F.2d 920 (4th
Cir. 1962).
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example of the divergency among some of the federal courts in re-
lation to the cases which concern delay is reflected in a recent case
where the district court said:
No plan ... for general rearrangement of an entire local
school system should be required by this or any court with-
out affording to both the school authorities and the public
ample time for consideration and discussion of alterna-
tives.
52
This case also provides an example of how the federal judiciary
can greatly aid the general dilatory tactics beyond the standardized
legal procedures which are admittedly and necessarily slow.
In many rural areas of the South, counties are economically
unable to provide more than one high school. By reason of this
economic status the progress of integration seemingly has been
enhanced when there are Negroes willing to become litigants. In
one such case a high school student was required to attend school
over fifty miles from his home.53 It was stated by a district court
that "plaintiffs have a legal right to the enjoyment of the oppor-
tunities in the county of their residence . . .-54 It seems clear that
such discrimination could not stand up even under the "separate but
equal" test when one considers the gross disadvantages that student
suffers by either having to live away from home during the school
week or having to travel very lengthy distances each day.
The school systems which maintain a patent inequality of
academic programs between "white" and "Negro" schools also
aid desegregation. 55 Such inequalities provide a tangible violation
of the Brown decision.
IV. PUPIL ASSIGNMENT LAWS
Perhaps the most important facet of the officially sponsored
"resistance movement" is an idea drawn from a well-developed
practice throughout the country which affords the segregationist
or anti-integrationist school board an opportunity to discriminate
on a wide scale under the guise of an elaborate set of criteria which
are, in essence, divorced from race. Pupil-assignment, or enroll-
ment plans, have been enacted in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas and Virginia. The Alabama statute is similar 56 to others
.52 Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, Ala., 219 F. Supp.
542 (S.D. Ala. 1963). This decision was rendered after the court of appeals
had said, in reference to the same case, " . . . the amount of time available
for the transition from segregated to desegregated schools becomes more
sharply limited with the passage of the years since the first and second
Brown decisions." Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County,
Ala., 318 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1963). The district court decision was reversed
and the Supreme Court refused to stay an order of the court of appeals
requiring a plan for immediate desegregation. Board of School Comm'rs
of Mobile County, Ala. v. Davis, 84 S. Ct. 10 (1963).
53 School B'd of Warren County v. Kilby, 259 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1958).
54 Griffith v. Board of Educ. of Yancey County, 186 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.
N.C. 1960).
55 See Mapp v. Board of Educ. of City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 319 F.2d 571
(6th Cir. 1963). The board was, however, merely required to make a study
and submit a plan within a reasonable time.
56 ALA. CODE tit. 52 § 61 (4) (1957 Supp.).
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and has as its criteria for assignment the following: available room,
teaching capacity, transportation, effect of admission of new pupils
on established or proposed academic programs, suitability of estab-
lished curricula for particular pupils, adequacy of pupils' academic
preparation for admission, scholastic aptitude and relative intelli-
gence, mental energy or ability of individual pupils, phychological
qualification of pupils for type of teaching and associations in-
volved, effect of admission of pupils upon academic progress of
others, effect of admission on academic standards, possibility of
breaches of the peace or ill will or economic retaliation within the
community, possibility of threat of friction or disorder among pupils
or others, home environment of the pupil, maintainenance or sev-
erance of established social and psychological relationships with
other pupils, morals, conduct, health, and personal standards of the
pupil, request or consent of parents or guardian and the reasons
assigned therefor.
57
The pupil assignment laws have presented the best answer for
those school boards and their respective controlling governments
which are intent upon an avoidance of the Brown decision. This
success has depended upon several factors among which is the vir-
tually insurmountable task which confronts petitioners who wish
to challenge such an act "on its face" as an unconstitutional device
to thwart school integration. Such an attack was attempted in be-
half of his children by the Reverend Fred L. Shuttlesworth, a leading
civil rights figure in Alabama.58 The three-judge federal district
court set out the requirements to successfully challenge the con-
stitutionality of an assignment law "on its face." These requirements
are:
1. The law must be the source of authority by virtue of which
the petitioners are prevented from attending the schools of
their choice.
2. There must be a showing that the denial of attendance was
based upon race by application of such law.
3. There must be a showing that the entire act is unconstitu-
tional, unless the petitioners can show the exact grounds
upon which their denial was based. 59
Shuttlesworth admitted the validity of some of the criteria
listed in the Alabama Pupil Assignment law 60 and it was there-
fore decided that the petitioners were bound to show, in the face
of a strong presumption against unconstitutionality, that the denial
was not based upon a valid ground. The court decided that the act
was constitutional 61 and this decision was affirmed per curiam by
the Supreme Court.6 2
There has been considerable divergency among the courts in
dealing with the pupil assignment laws, ranging from a strongly
realistic appraisal of the racial situation in the schools, notwith-
57 GREENBERG, op. cit. supra note 5 at 233.58 N.C. GEN. STATS. § 115-176 (1960).
59 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham B'd of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.
1958).60 ALA. CODE, supra note 56.
61 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham B'd of Educ., supra note 59.
62 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham B'd of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
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standing the existence of an assignment law,63 to the relatively
narrow interpretation of the "exhaustion of remedies" requirement.
It has been decided that the pupil assignment law, in and of itself,
does not represent an inconsistency to racial segregation but is
merely the legal machinery under which compliance could be
started so that the principal issue under this reasoning is one of
actual steps toward desegregation rather than the constitutional
application of the pupil assignment law.64 This approach, if adopted
by more of the district courts, could be thoroughly destructive to
the reason for which such laws were enacted. Other courts have
required that there be a showing of an unconstitutional application
of the assignment laws.6 5 The basis for unconstitutional application
is usually found in the fact that the initial assignments were made
solely on the basis of race,6 6 thereby requiring a Negro student who
desires attendance at a non-segregated school to apply for a trans-
fer.67 The Caswell County, North Carolina School Board denied the
petitioner's transfer request which was based, in part, on the desire
to go to an integrated school regardless of race, creed or color. The
school board said, "we cannot assign them on account of race." The
court of appeals aptly answered, "A requirement of the School
Cases is that transfer applications be not denied on grounds that
are racially discriminatory, but a victim of racial discrimination
does not disqualify himself for all relief when he complains of it."6
One court remarked in response to the racially based assignments
and collateral transfer requirement that "Negro children cannot
be required to apply for that to which they are entitled as a matter
of right."6 9 It has been decided that the plans whereby criteria are
applied only to those students who request a transfer from racially
assigned schools are in derogation of the law.70 Such decision is
based upon the factual observation that the only students who re-
quest transfers from segregated schools are Negroes.
In many instances the school board has allegedly assigned stu-
dents on some basis other than race. It has been held that the as-
signment founded upon some loosely conceived, non-objective pos-
sibility is invalid. 71 Factors such as the possibility of threat of fric-
tion or disorder among the pupils and others, the possibility of
breach of peace or economic retaliation are not justifiable when
such factors pertain only to race.12 One rather strong case deter-
613 See East Baton Rouge Parish School B'd v. Davis, 287 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.
1961); Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction, Dade County, Fla., 272
F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1959).
64 Gibson v. Board of Public Instruction, supra note 63.
65 Green v. School B'd of City of Roanoke, Va., 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962)
Hamm v. County School B'd of Arlington County, 263 F.2d 226 (4th Cir.
1959).
66 See Beckett v. School B'd of City of Norfolk, Va., 185 F. Supp. 459 (E.D.
Va. 1959), aff'd sub nom. Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960).
67 See Wheeler v .Durham City B'd of Educ., 309 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1962);
Green v. School B'd of City of Roanoke, Va., supra note 65.
6SJeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621, 635 (4th Cir. 1962).
69 Northcross v. Board of Educ. of City of Memphis, Tenn., 302 F.2d 818,
823 (6th Cir. 1962).
70 Hill v. School B'd of City of Norfolk, Va., 282 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1960).
71 Hamm v. County School B'd of Arlington County, Va., supra note 65.
72 Calhoun v. Members of B'd of Educ., City of Atlanta, 188 F. Supp. 401
(N.D. Ga. 1959).
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mined that tests dealing with scholastic aptitude, relative intel-
ligence and the effect of the pupil's admission on academic progress
were unacceptable. 3 Naturally, the power to assign pupils to schools
"arbitrarily according to whim or caprice ... [is] legally impermis-
sible, .. .-74 Hence, it is clear that any obvious discriminatory as-
signment or any racially based assignment which is made under
the guise of a justifiable standard will be struck down with little
difficulty. At the same time it can be seen that the school boards
have considerable latitude in the application of the assignment
laws as is evidenced by the small degree of success made toward
desegration in those states which use the pupil assignment laws.
The laws have won the appreciation of some of the federal
courts on the foundation that the Brown decision has created such
varied problems, so many administrative difficulties and such un-
predictable solutions ". . . that courts are not in a position to bar
absolutely the use of the Act by a school board sincerely attempt-
ing an orderly transition to full desegregation by a fixed date.
'75
It seems fair to say, though, that once a school board has indicated
its insincerity in one way or another the courts should no longer
allow an absolute application of the pupil assignment laws, in that
the placement principles ". . . serve only in subordinancy or ad-
junctiveness to the task of getting rid of the imposed segregation
situation.
'76
One recent breakthrough in the area of transfer provisions
was brought about by a Supreme Court ruling on a Knoxville, Ten-
nessee, plan which allowed a student to transfer, upon his request,
if the student would otherwise be required to attend a school where
73 Davis v. Board of Educ. of Charleston Consolidated School Dist., 216
F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
74 Orleans Parish School B'd v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 1957).
75 Bush v. Orleans Parish School B'd, 308 F.2d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 1962).
76 Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256, 259 (8th Cir. 1960).
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the majority of students were of a different race. The Court decided
this provision to be unconstitutional, stating that ". . . no official
transfer plan or provision of which racial segregation is the in-
evitable consequence may stand under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.""
The major tacts taken by the courts when confronted with a
recalcitrant school board have been: the injunction against dis-
criminatory practices to be effective until the board submits a
suitable plan for ending discrimination; r8 a threat to allow the
petitioners and all similarly situated to enter schools on a non-
segregated basis unless the board submitted a plan to end the exist-
ing practices with all deliberate speed; 9 the injunction issued for
transfer or initial assignment to a school attended solely or largely
by pupils of the other race if the board follows the practice of as-
signment based upon race.8 0 It can be seen that the courts have
been pushed to the point of having to use forceful threats to
achieve some degree of compliance with the law.
V. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
One of the important problems related to some of the pupil
assignment laws and the one which has caused an almost stultifying
effect to school desegregation in North Carolina is that of the "ex-
haustion of remedies" requirement. Many courts have been willing
to look through the facade of administrative remedies and decide
that the statutorily required remedies need not be met before
bringing action in the federal district court.81 Certainly, when
there is an announced policy of segregation82 or when it is other-
wise apparent that the exhaustion of remedies would be a futile
gesture8 3 the petitioners need not go through the entire adminis-
trative procedure before bringing an action in the federal district
court. One case decided that the remedies need not be exhausted
when a school board, which had fully integrated its schools so as
to grant relief to the plantiffs, proceeded to transfer all white
pupils and teachers and administrators so as to reinstate the plain-
tiffs in a segregated school.84 The realistic approach of these cases
may be contrasted with the Fourth Circuit cases which have dealt
with the North Carolina Assignment and Enrollment of Pupils Act. 5
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that in spite of
7i Goss v. Board of Educ. of City of Knoxville, Tenn., 373 U.S. 683, 689
(1963). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the same type of
transfer provision to be unconstitutional one year prior to the Goss de-
cision. Dilliard v. School B'd of City of Charlottesville, Va., supra note 51.
78 Wheeler v. Durham City B'd of Educ., supra note 67.
79 Green v. School B'd of City of Roanoke, Va., supra note 65.8 0 Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621 (4th Cir. 1962).
81 See Armstrong v. Board of Educ. of City of Birmingham, 323 F.2d 333
(5th Cir. 1963) ; Farley v. Turner, supra note 66.
82 School B'd of Charlottesville, Va. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956);
Kelly v. Board of Educ. of City of Nashville, 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D.
Tenn. 1958).
83 Marsh v. County School B'd of Roanoke County, Va., 305 F.2d 94 (4th
Cir. 1962); Jackson v. School B'd of City of Lynchburg, Va., 201 F. Supp.
620 (W.D. Va. 1962), rev'd on other grounds 308 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1962).
s4 McCoy v. Greensboro City B'd of Educ., 283 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1960).85 N.C. GEN. STATS. § 115-176 (1960).
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the fact that a board had made assignments in a racially discrimina-
tory manner, no injunction could issue because there was an indi-
vidual administrative remedy which must first be exhausted.8 6 The
court has decided that petitioners who fail to attend investigatory
hearings, which are not specifically required by the statute,8 7 have
not met the administrative requirements."8 One limiting factor
about the North Carolina act is that petitioners will be considered
on an individual basis only, 9 so that any victory is necessarily
small. The court has placed a special emphasis upon the exhaustion
of remedies under this act 90 and requires one to go through the en-
tire process before being enabled to bring a class action in the fed-
eral court.91 One sadly ironic statement made by the court in con-
nection with the exhaustion of remedies, in light of the above illus-
trations of school board inaction and evasive tactics, was as follows:
Somebody must enroll the pupils in the schools. They
cannot enroll themselves; and we can think of no one better
qualified to undertake the task than the officials of the
schools and the school boards having the schools in
charge.
92
The pupil assignment laws and their various requirements re-
main as one of the chief instruments of the anti-integration forces
although some significant inroads have been made toward making
these laws more objective and less racially directed in their op-
eration.
VI. DESEGREGATION PLANS
There are communities which have made genuine efforts to-
ward some compliance with the Brown decision. Prominent among
these communities is Nashville which adopted a twelve year plan
for school integration. 93 The first grade is integrated in the first year
and each successive year another grade is integrated until all grades
through high school are integrated. The court upheld the plan on
the basis of empirical evidence and the good faith showing of the
school board.94 On the other hand, the Delaware School Board was
disallowed the use of a gradual integration plan and ordered to
institute full integration on the following school year.9 5 The court
compared Delaware with Nashville by noting the presence of the
rural, Deep South emotions in Nashville and a larger number of
Negroes than in Delaware. The court also said in this respect:
[I] ntegration in the State of Delaware, which has already
integrated many of its schools . . . should not be viewed,
gauged or judged by the more restrictive standards reason-
86 Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959).
87 NC. GEN. STATS. § 115-178 (1960).
'8 Holt v. Raleigh City B'd of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1959) ; McKissick
v. Durham City B'd of Educ., 176 F. Supp. 3 (M.D. N.C. 1959).
89 N.C. GEN. STATS. § 115-176 (1960) ; Covington v. Edwards, supra note 86.
90 See Carson v. Board of Educ. of McDowell County, 227 F.2d 789 (4th
Cir. 1955).
91 See Covington v. Edwards, supra note 86.
92 Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956).
93 Kelley v. Board of Educ. of City of Nashville, 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 924 (1959).
94 Ibid.
95 Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960).
VOL. XLI
STUDY OF CIRCUMVENTION
ably applicable to communities which have not advanced
as far upon the road toward full integration as has Dele-
ware.96
It is therefore clear that the plans are going to be judged
upon societal factors so that one plan will not necessarily be ap-
plicable to another community and one plan which is acceptable
for the elementary grades may not be valid for the high school.97
The so-called "voluntary" plan has been uniformly invalidated
as racially based.9 The plan sets up three types of school; the
white, Negro and integrated. Each child may choose the type of
school he wishes to attend, his choice then being enforced manda-
torily. It readily can be seen that this plan would not produce any
great change in the composition of student bodies in southern
communities. One case saw the amazing phenomenon of the district
court judge suggesting such a "voluntary plan" rather than the
twelve year plan which was offered by the school board. The court
rejected the twelve year plan in these words: ". . . the plan sub-
mitted by the Board will manifestly lead to an amalgamation of
the races . . ."9 The obstacles to the enforcement of this Supreme
Court decision are indeed many.
VII. CONCLUSION
The factors which are effectively operating to evade school
desegregation in toto or to a substantial degree are by no means
limited to those mentioned in this paper. As was discussed pre-
viously, the object of this study was to analyze those means of
evasion that are officially endorsed by the state authorized bodies
and the regularly elected and appointed officials. There are a
wide range of social factors which are extremely influential in
discouraging litigants who might wish to bring a desegregation
action:
While threat to job and life is not so strong in border states,
in places like Mississippi and Alabama, the risk is very real
and few, understandably, are willing to venture it.100
Also those private groups or organizations, particularly the
N.A.A.C.P., which have been most successful in helping to bring
about school desegregation are subjected to almost constant harass-
ment by governmental and private sources in most southern
06 Ibid.
97 See Moore v. Board of Educ. of Harford County, 152 F. Supp. 114 (D.
Md. 1957), aff'd sub nom. Slade v. Board of Educ. of Harford County,
252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir 1958).
98 Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Houston Independent School
Dist. v. Ross, 282 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960); Kelley v. Board of Educ. of
City of Nashville, supra note 93.
99 Borders v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Tex. 1960). This case had
an unusually prolonged history ranging from 1955 through four reversals
and one modification until 1961 when federal district court Judge David-
son, by direction of the court of appeals, ordered the twelve year plan
into effect, "in disregard of the schools' plans and, constitution and laws
of Texas." Borders v. Rippy, 195 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
100 Letter from Marian E. Wright, staff member, N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc., January 7, 1964. See generally GREENBERG,
RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW (1959).
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states. 01 There is also the problem which has been merely touched
upon here, of the inclination and attitude of the district judges,
who do have the responsibility for implementation of the Brown
decision. Considering the strong societal influences which are im-
posed upon the judges as well as the fact that virtually all of the
district court judges are southern born, southern raised and south-
ern educated, it becomes clear that the lack of progress of school
desegregation in the South can, in large part, be attributed to the
reluctant or antagonistic members of the federal judiciary.
0 2
1964 marks the tenth anniversary year of the Brown decision;
yet because of the continuing influence of the forces that have been
here discussed, a substantial majority of southern students con-
tinue to attend rigidly segregated schools. In fact, of the 2,901,671
Negro students in the eleven southern states, 1 0 3 98.9 per cent are still
in all-Negro schools.
0 4
One possible solution to this continual problem of enforced
school segregation is the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 which
in pertinent part permits the Attorney General to initiate school
desegregation actions in the federal courts at the request of com-
plainants who are unable to maintain appropriate legal proceed-
ings.1 0 5 It is obvious that some new answers are needed. Answers
which, possibly, go beyond the limited framework which has here-
tofore predominated our thinking'0 6 should be examined carefully.
In the tenth year since the Brown decision, thoughts should be
directed toward full and immediate compliance with the law.
101 See generally PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN ch. 3 (1961); BLAU-
STEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW ch. 15 (1957).
102 See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County B'd of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667
(S.D. Ga. 1963); Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School B'd, 214 F.
Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1963), in which Judge West said, " . . . I personally
regard the 1954 holding of the United States Supreme Court in the now
famous Brown case as one of the truly regrettable decisions of all times."
103 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
104 New York Times Western Edition, Jan. 24, 1964, p. 15, col. 5. See gen-
erally Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights
of Persons Within the Jurisdiction of the U.S., 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
4, pt. 2, at 1509 (1963), statement of Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, Anthony J. Celebrezze.
105 H.R. 7708, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. § 307 (1963).
106 See generally statement by Senator John Sherman Cooper in 34 NOTRE
DAME LAW 612 (1959).
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